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Abstract In 2008 the European Union adopted an apparently radical reform of
its wine policy. However, whether this policy change actually reinstitutionalizes the
regulation of this industry is dependent on how it is implemented and represented
by both commercial operators and regulators located at national and intra-national
scales. Using interview and documentary data generated on this process in France,
Spain and Romania, this article sets out to compare and explain the differentiated
institutionalization of the reform that has actually occurred to date. Its key
empirical finding is that reinstitutionalization is dependent on the degree to which
change has been legitimated within such regions. More precisely, durable change or
maintenance of the status quo stems from how conflicts over different parts of the
EU’s reform have been framed and debated locally. This finding has two wider
implications for institutionalist theories of political change. First, constructivist
accounts of the framing of collective and public problems need to be brought to the
fore. Second, at least when studying contemporary Europe, the question of scale
and its institutional effects should be systematically built into research strategies
and methodologies.
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Introduction
In 2008, the Council of the European Union (EU) adopted a regulation
(479/2008) that claimed to radically reform its Common Market Organization
(CMO) for wine and thereby the regulation of this industry in Europe.1 Indeed,
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to borrow Peter Hall’s well-known typology of ‘social learning’ (1993), this
legislation appeared to herald a ‘third order change’ because it incorporated
not only a recalibration of policy instruments (first order) and their partial
replacement (second order), but also changed in the European wine industry’s
hierarchy of objectives, as well as the values around which they have been
justified.
As Box 1 describes, a range of policy instruments that were once at the heart
of the EU’s intervention in the wine industry have either been abandoned or
transformed. For example, large budgets for the distillation of surplus wine
have been phased out and some of the money saved has been devoted instead
to promoting European wines in third countries. But the reform ostensibly also
sought to induce much deeper change by modifying not only the hierarchy
Box 1: A comparison of the Commission’s legislative proposal and of the Regulation adopted
The initial proposal a Regulation 479/2008
Rules concerning production:
K Banning enrichment through added sugar K Not obtained but maximum level reduced
K Reintroducing a subsidy for grubbing out
200 000 ha of vines over 5 years
K Obtained but changed (175 000 ha over 3
years)
K Ending plantation rights as of 1 January
2014
K Obtained but delayed until 2015-2018
K Transferring authorization of œnological
practices to the Commission and adoption
of such practices permitted by the
Organisation Internationale de la vigne et
du vin (OIV)
K Obtained
Rules concerning marketing and restructuring:
K Ending distillation aids K Obtained: distillation phased out 2008-2012
K Ending export restitutions K Obtained
K Introduction of a new categorization of
wine: with or without a Geographical
Indication (GI)
K Obtained
K Authorization of wines without GIs to
bear mention of grape varietals and year
of harvest
K Obtained
K Creation of a budget of 120 million euros
(cofinanced 50 per cent by the EU) to
promote EU wines in third countries
K Obtained
K Authorization of ‘national envelopes’ to
aid the adjustment of growers and
merchants
K Obtained (eg in 2011 France received 280
million euros from the EU as cofinancing)
aCom(2007)372, European Commission, 4 July 2007.
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between two policy objectives – maintaining levels of production and making
European wine easier to market – but also the causal theory that had hitherto
linked these two goals. In a nutshell, instead of basing policy on the assumption
that ‘producing quality and authentic wine will lead to more sales’, the 2008
reform was built on a very different contention that only wine that fits with the
demand of the ‘modern consumer’ is economically sustainable and, therefore,
merits EU support. Moreover, this shift in objectives and assumptions has been
accompanied by value-laden discourse about the ‘goodness’ of producing for
markets and the ‘badness’ of relying on public intervention.
That was the theory, but what has occurred in practice? What has happened
during implementation to the ‘blueprint’ for deep policy and political change
set out in the Council regulation? Has the paradigm shift experienced at the
EU scale been mirrored at national and local scales? Based on research on
implementation in three national vineyards and political systems (France,
Spain and Romania),2 sections two and three of this article provide some
empirical answers to this classical question of public policy analysis. Before
doing so, however, the first section sets out why the theoretical ambition of our
research is to bind comparative analysis of how the EU’s reform has been
implemented into a broader constructivist and institutionalist perspective on
political change. Indeed, the analytical framework developed in this section,
together with the empirical findings it has enabled us to uncover, generates the
main thesis defended in this piece: focusing on the politics of institutionaliza-
tion, rather than institutions themselves, is the most heuristic means of
understanding diversity in the implementation of EU reforms.
Studying Implementation as Institutionalization
Since the path-breaking work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), public policy
analysis has studied implementation as a vital political process that can and
should be conceptualized differently from the question of ‘compliance’. This
distinction is particularly relevant within EU studies because whereas specialists
of compliance legitimately focus on the transposition of EU regulations and
directives into national law and then their enforcement (Falkner, 2005; Falkner
and Treib, 2008), analysts of implementation instead expect national and local
‘translations’ (Smith, 1997) of EU legislation to be heterogeneous. This
expectation is not derived from the rationalist assumption that ‘agents’ distant
from their ‘principals’ in Brussels will always seek to maximize their autonomy
until they are punished for doing so. Rather, implementation is studied as a
form of translation first because definitions of the ‘public problem’ (Rochefort
and Cobb, 1994) being tackled are likely to differ and, second, because pre-
existing configurations of institutions and actors will always vary. In short,
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research carried out in this vein is fundamentally both constructivist and
institutionalist.
But how can constructivist epistemology best be coherently articulated with
institutionalist concepts and research strategies designed to capture the causes
and extent of political change? As others have highlighted (Hay, 2006; Parsons,
2007), we consider that the challenge here is to take support from historical
institutionalism while avoiding some of its analytical traps. This institutionalism
is definitely a source of analytical purchase for at least three reasons. First,
by defining institutions as stabilized sets of rules, norms and conventions, it
clearly conceptualizes public policymaking as attempts to change or reproduce
institutions (Hall and Taylor, 2009). Second, within any social or economic
space, such as the wine sector, institutions are rightly considered not only to
place constraints on actor behaviour, but also to provide the very conditions for
such activity to take place in a relatively predictable and therefore durable
fashion (Fligstein, 2001). Finally, within historical institutionalism a great deal
of work has recently been devoted to identifying the causes of institutional
change as not simply being ‘exogenous shocks’. Thelen (2003) in particular
highlights instead ‘the cumulative effect of continuous change’, which occurs
‘under the surface of apparently stable institutional arrangements’. Consequently,
she proposes a distinction between ‘two modes of change’: (1) ‘institutional
layering’, that is, ‘the partial renegotiation of some elements of a set of institutions
which leaves others unchanged’ and (2) ‘institutional conversion’: when change in
the environment raises new problems that the actors confront by using existing
institutions differently. Such conversion is usually the result of the incorporation
of previously excluded actors or groups who modify the aims of existing
institutions (see also Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Hall and Thelen, 2009; Mahoney
and Thelen, 2010).
Notwithstanding the value of these variants of institutionalism, we seek to
go beyond them for empirical and theoretical reasons. As regards the former,
in our case study we also refute the ‘exogenous shock’ thesis. However, Thelen’s
hypothesis of ‘institutional sedimentation’ does not fit given that instead of a
‘partial negotiation’ an overall reform took place. Moreover, ‘institutional
conversion’ has not occurred either, since most of the instruments of the CMO
have been replaced rather than converted. More fundamentally, Thelen’s
approach to policy change has two problematical features we consider can only
be addressed by adopting an alternative theory-driven viewpoint.
The first of these features is simply the neglect of implementation as
a decision-making phase of public policy and institution-building. In the
standard version of historical neo-institutionalism (for example, Pierson,
1996), governments adopt institutional changes that are quickly followed
by phenomena of ‘lock-in’, which in turn make institutions self-reinforcing
and actor behaviour ‘path dependent’. We instead consider that full
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institutionalization of such a change in the economy or society will only occur
when its content is accepted as ‘fitting’ with actor practices. Indeed, as
Franc¸ois argues persuasively, ‘There are not on the one hand rules with an
independent existence that soar above practices, and on the other practices
which are just their more or less imperfect and case by case translations. On
the contrary rules can only be grasped by examining practices’ (2011, p. 51).
One thus needs to build into accounts of institutional change the diversity of
actors within an industry and how their practices relate to institutions (for
example, wine cooperatives historically have had different practices with
independent producers and different relationships to the wine CMO). We thus
place emphasis on how the same (EU) policy can be constructed and used in
different ways, thereby contributing (or not) to its institutionalization in each
of the regions and professions it affects.
Second, unlike Thelen and her many followers, we consider it essential to
unpack the social representations of policy change held by a range of its
implementers in order to grasp the legitimacy, and thereby the degree of stability,
it is accorded. More precisely, we contend that rules, norms or conventions
potentially embed themselves as institutions within economic and social practices
because they are represented as legitimate parts of at least one of the four
‘institutionalized relationships’ (finance, employment, production, commercial)
through which an industry is governed (Jullien and Smith, 2008). Whether new
policy instruments become institutions is therefore dependent on the ‘political
work’ of legitimation, which, we hypothesize, must accompany the application of
any instrument if it is to stabilize and have governing effects over time. Put
succinctly, our question here is therefore not only about the effects of institutions
on actor behaviour, but also on potential shifts in their respective legitimacy –
what Colin Hay calls ‘the normalization of policy paradigms’ (2006, p. 59).
Overall, then, our institutionalism seeks to maintain its constructivist
epistemology from the stage of research design right through to the written
presentation of findings. This approach will now be applied to the case of EU
wine policy reform in two distinct sections. First, we examine the impact of
change on the most deeply interventionist dimension of previous CMOs, which
since 1970 had involved large budgets in attempts to alter the supply of grapes
and wine. Second, we look at how the reform has sought to bring about a
reprogramming of markets through its modification of rules on the definition
of wine and its categories.3
The End of Interventionism?
Deep intervention in the economy, and in certain industries in particular, was a
well-known feature of most European polities from at least the end of the
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nineteenth century until the 1980s and 1990s. This was particularly the case in
the southern wine-producing states – France, Italy and Spain – which have
dominated Europe’s wine production and its political regulation. Indeed, to a
large extent the EU’s wine CMOs largely transposed to the EU scale a French
policy paradigm that had existed since at least the 1930s (Smith et al, 2007;
Colman, 2008). These instruments aimed principally at controlling wine prices
through limiting the supply of grapes produced (section ‘The deregulation of
vine growing’) and the supply of wine released onto the market (section
‘Abandoning subsidized distillation: Deregulating supply?’). The architects of
the latest EU reform sought instead to abandon these instruments and thereby
‘liberalize’ the European wine industry. If part of this ideological project does
indeed appear to have had considerable impact on productive and commercial
practices, the institutions involved are represented in ways that accord them
different degrees of legitimacy.
The deregulation of vine growing
From the point of view of grape production, the EU’s reform set out to reduce
the number of vines in vineyards that have low profitability, but also to
abandon controls on new plantings so as to encourage expansion in areas that
‘the market’ favours. Both these attempts at deep policy change met with
considerable resistance during the negotiation phase, many protagonists
accusing the Commission of ‘Malthusianism’ and wanting to ‘delocalize’ wine
production to a small number of prosperous vineyards. However, during
implementation only the abandoning of planting rights has continued to spark
controversy and new forms of political activism.
Grubbing out vines
The Commission’s initial proposal was to subsidize the grubbing out of no less
than 400 000 hectares of vines ostensibly in order to ‘cleanse’ the market of low-
quality wines that were seen as dragging prices down. A less clearly stated
objective was to reduce the number of growers in Europe by eliminating the
smallest, concentrating supply and thereby supporting only the most commer-
cially ‘efficient’. After considerable mobilization by producer groups and
national administrations, this figure was more than halved in the final version of
the regulation. As Table 1 shows, the take-up of this policy instrument has been
considerable. But beyond these figures it is even more important to discover
intra-national differences and, above all, how grubbing out as a politico-
economic practice has come to be represented by all the actors concerned.
In Spain, demand for grubbing out aid has been extremely high.4 At one
level, the take-up of this practice therefore seems to vindicate the Commission’s
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initial proposal on grubbing out. However, our interviews with representatives
of growers and cooperatives highlight that this removal of vines may not have
a significant impact on production levels and markets. First, they consider that
much of the land taken out of production had been the least productive, which
explains why overall supply has not significantly dropped. Second, and more
fundamentally still, they consider that too much of the aid has been given as a
social payment to growers leaving the industry altogether, rather than to those
who seek instead to restructure their vineyards and thereby contribute to the
industry’s future:
We in the COAG have positioned ourselves against this measure because
this is about a large sum of money, thousands of euros, which is going
to people who are leaving the sector. But, you understand, I’m 33 and
I want to try to continue to live from this sector. In other words, my
objective and that of this organization, was not to obtain money for
people who leave the sector, but for those who stay!5
Indeed, this point is doubtless made with particular force by this actor because
he comes from Castilla–La Mancha, the region that has accounted for no less
than 70 per cent of the vines grubbed out in Spain. Meanwhile, grubbing out
has had far fewer and sometimes no takers in other regions such as the Rioja
where vines are still much sought after. Consequently, the position of the
Spanish government over grubbing out is paradoxical: in general it is seen as a
loss of the country’s productive potential, but at the same time this measure is
viewed as helping resolve certain agricultural and even agrarian problems.
Similarly in France, the most immediately remarkable feature of the
implementation of this policy instrument is its concentration in one region,
the Languedoc Rousillon, where 16 098 hectares of vines were grubbed out
between 2008 and 2011. In contrast, only 1428 hectares have been removed in
Aquitaine. Nonetheless, the most commonly held representation in this region
is that grubbing out remains a ‘relevant’ policy tool:
I think it’s one of those tools that are useful in certain circumstances (y).
In a difficult year where production has been prolific you have to be able
Table 1: Vines grubbed out 2008-2011
Area grubbed out (ha) % of 2008 vineyard
Spain 97 825 7
France 22 938 2
Source: Vitisphere, 25 February, 2011.
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to manage supply and demand. And above all to manage the wines that
are not worthy of the name ‘Bordeaux’. You need to be able to have the
right levers so that the client is satisfied.6
Indeed, as in Spain, there is a deep-seated individual and collective worry that
without this policy instrument, in the future volumes of production in Europe
will not be sufficiently controlled. In short, even when this measure has not
been applied heavily in their own wine areas, for such actors the EU giving up a
means of controlling the volume of supply is experienced as an additional
source of economic uncertainty.
In Romania it is widely acknowledged by the principal actors in the wine
industry that their national vineyard suffers greatly from the continued
importance of hybrid varietals such as Noah, Othello, Jacquez or Herbement
(92 000 ha of vines producing 2.23 million hl of wine per year) compared with
‘noble’ ones (84 200 ha for 3.14 million hl). These actors sought but failed to
have some of the cost of replacing the hybrids paid for by the EU within the
framework of the accession agreement and/or the reform of the wine CMO.
Given that the Romanian government has thus far refused to subsidize
grubbing out itself, this policy is therefore virtually at a standstill, with only
1000 ha of vine being dealt with each year.7 The reaction of the actors who
dominate this industry is one of frustration that what they see as a structural,
or even societal, problem is not currently being dealt with and, consequently, is
continuing to have negative knock-on effects:
The big issue is one of agrarian structure. At the time of decollectiviza-
tion a lot of people received a small amount of land they do not know
what to do with. The solution would be to regroup this land in the form
of co-operatives. But in the generation that experienced communism
there is incredible resistance to any form of collective production.
Fortunately these are old people who will soon be replaced by wine-
makers who are better able to understand the usefulness of associations
and co-operative structures.8
In the Romanian case, grubbing out has not been about improving the quality
of wine produced in the EU, but rather about reconfiguring the industry by
concentrating supply in the hands of a small number of operators. The
grubbing out that was imposed on Romania for reasons of improved quality
(eradicating hybrid varietals) has not been subsidized by the EU. Moreover,
the actors involved all legitimize grubbing out as being done in the name of
concentrating supply, and this by recycling and repeating a discourse about
efficiency they have imported from elsewhere. Indeed, the Romanian case
highlights that across the European wine industry, the instrument of grubbing
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out has given rise to differentiated legitimations because there is a considerable
difference between a qualitative logic (pulling out vines to improve wine
quality) and a quantitative one (ending production in order to concentrate
supply).
Liberalizing planting rights
The notion of Europe’s wine industry ‘losing control’ is even more present in
reactions to the second part of the 2008 reform’s anti-interventionist content
that concerns planting rights. In France, growers have had to apply for the
right to plant wines since the beginning of the twentieth century. Following
what was seen as a ‘European crisis of overproduction’ in the early 1970s,
French actors subsequently ensured that this instrument was transposed to the
scale of the European Community, with the unstated aim of limiting expansion
of production in Italy. Since the early 1990s, however, a number of actors,
and in particular officials from DG Agriculture’s wine unit and representatives
of large wine merchants, have sought to abandon this policy measure in the
name of lowering ‘the administrative burden’ on economic operators,
‘liberalizing markets’ and conforming with the rest of the reformed Common
Agricultural Policy. Although some supporters of this part of the CMO’s
reform remain, and are particularly present in Romania,9 adverse reaction in
the areas studied has been considerable. Indeed, at the time of writing it seems
likely to further delay the termination of this policy instrument, if not lead to
its reinstitutionalization.
Growers from France have consistently taken a lead in delegitimizing this
issue and organizing resistance to what has been seen in this country as a
Commission-wine merchant priority. This has taken its most visible form
through the creation of a ‘European Federation of Origin Wines’ (EFOW), led
by the French Confe´de´ration nationale des appellations d’origine controˆle´e
(CNAOC), a development paralleled first by the enrolment of the French
government and subsequently by many others (Smith, 2011). To date, the
result of this European-scale political work has been considerable given that
12 national governments have given very public support to a change in EU
policy on this point.
In order to gauge the depth of this resistance, however, analysis of the views
expressed by actors from regions with many AOC wines, such as Aquitaine, is
highly instructive. In all our interviews in this region every producer
representative has unequivocally stated that they want plantation rights
retained, while no merchant has spoken against them. Indeed, they all see
AOCs as impossible to manage without an accompanying system of planting
rights. Of course, some wine merchants located in Aquitaine do not necessarily
share this unreserved support for plantation rights. Nevertheless, even large
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companies present throughout France tend to see their liberalization more as a
risk than as an opportunity:
We don’t have a specfic position for or against. But what we do know
is that over the past few years a lot of effort has been put into
improving the quality of our wines (y). So everything that today may
go against the quality of French wines is to be handled with great care
(y). If one can just plant without any particular constraints, what is
that going to produce tomorrow? There will no longer be a handle on
this, one will no longer be able to control it (y). That’s taking an
enormous risk.10
More generally, within France plantation rights do not appear to have become
a symbolic issue that creates or recreates divisions between wine merchants
and growers. Rather, there is currently a French consensus that these rights to
plant give those who govern the industry some sort of hold on both the volume
and the quality of supply.11
No such consensus exists in Spain, however, where wine merchants and
large wine-producing companies have been very much in favour of
liberalizing plantations, whereas representatives of smaller growers, co-
operatives and governments of regions such as La Rioja have sought to resist
this policy change. Represented by the increasingly powerful Federacio´n
espan˜ola del vino (FEV), in 2007 the former convinced their national
government to back this part of the wine CMO’s reform with the following
type of argument:
We do need a system for managing planting, but not, as a consequence,
limitations or a ban on them. Because one becomes lazy in AOC zones,
in these clusters, and one no longer actually manages potential
production.12
Notwithstanding this support from the FEV and the large wine merchants
and wineries it represents, resistance on this issue from growers has been
consistent and, over time, has managed to change the position of the Spanish
government from having supported the Commission’s initial proposal to
now opposing it.13 The position of the COAG on this point has always been
unequivocal:
We have asked our minister of agriculture to position herself, as Sarkozy
and Merkel have, against the liberalization of planting. Because we do
not understand that on one hand subsidies are given to grub out vines,
while on the other planting has been liberalized.14
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More precisely, one fear here is that entire areas of vines will be ‘delocalized’
to regions whose wines currently sell the best. In Spain at least, this threat of
delocalization is often linked to actual events that took place in the recent
past and which involve the Rioja wine region in particular. As is well known,
the latter has experienced not only a rise in its notoriety over the last three
decades, but also an expansion of its levels of planting and production.
Indeed, since the late 1990s, among Spanish regions the Rioja has benefited
the most from new planting rights. Consequently, some actors from elsewhere
in Spain fear not only that it will experience a disproportionate amount of
new vines in the future, but also that existing individual producers will lose a
patrimonial resource for which they have had to pay relatively large sums of
money:
In the Rioja as much as 25.000 euros a hectare have been paid for
plantation rights. It is obvious that this area now has a value that
contains the cost of the right, plus the value of the land, plus the value of
the right as applied to the land. But now on the field next door that has
yet to be planted, a grower can arrive and say ‘I’m planting here because
nobody can stop me or make me pay for it any more’.15
The debate over planting rights is set to be further politicized over the coming
months if not years. First, it is a policy instrument that many actors want to
retain or abolish because of its own properties. Second, many actors consider
that its retention would have wider ramifications for the new EU policy
paradigm. This is clearly the case, for example, for the Comite´ europe´en des
entreprises vin (CEEV), who, in their counterattack against the EFOW
coalition, recently underlined that ‘The coherent and balanced deployment of
the Wine CMO reform, in accordance with the stages which have been
accepted, must be respected in its entirety. It is essential to preserve this new
framework and its philosophy, constructed on the basis of the demand from
consumers and markets rather than production and supply’.16
Abandoning subsidized distillation: Deregulating supply?
In the 2008 reform, ending interventionism has meant not only an end to
controls over the size of production areas, but also abandoning a policy
instrument designed to control the amount of wine entering the market:
subsidized distillation. Together with public aid for stocking wine that existed
previously, this policy tool has generated controversy for decades because of its
cost, but also because it indirectly subsidized the production of brandy and
other alcoholic drinks.
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In France, and in Aquitaine in particular, the termination of distillation is
the part of the CMO’s reform that is considered the most legitimate. Indeed,
it is most often framed as ‘inevitable’. To quote one interviewee:
In terms of principles it’s very difficult to run against the course of
History. (y) distillation was a measure brought about by recognition of
a failure.17
However, it is in Spain that the abandoning of distillation has not only had the
greatest impact on producers, but also where debates about the legitimacy of
this policy change have been the most intense. Largely because much of the
Spanish vineyard, and in particular Castilla–La Mancha, had been devoted to
a type of white wine that has become very difficult to sell,18 by the mid-2000s as
much as a quarter of total national production was being distilled each year to
make alcohol. Not surprisingly, then, the two transition years authorized by
the CMO’s reform have continued to see large take-up for subsidized
distillation (the equivalent of 7.6 million hl a year).
In terms of political work around this issue area, the COAG have sought in
vain to defend distillation subsidies as a means of protecting the ‘diversity’ of
Spanish wines:
If we don’t subsidize the elimination of 4 million hl per year that is
currently distilled, imagine what 4 million hl will do to the wine market!
And all this with internal consumption continuing to decline.19
For its part, the cooperative movement has sought to take a more balanced
view, seeing the benefits of distillation aid for the wine market, but also that it
has tended to discourage producers from making efforts to improve both the
quality of their products and their marketing. Indeed, given the improvement
in wine quality they consider has taken place over the last 20 years, this accent
on marketing was underlined to us in an interview in the following terms:
We can say that today there is very little bad wine. There is wine that
sells badly. But bad wine, there’s very little of it, not here and not in
France.20
However, this type of representation contrasts strongly with the point of view
of the FEV, who are intensely critical of the previous CMO on this point:
In a nutshell, one used to say ‘we need that much, so how much wine do
we need to eliminate as alcohol in order to get that figure?’ Classical
management. ‘How do we manage this so that people turn wine into
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alcohol?’ Then you had to get that alcohol into a market – so a second
subsidy was neededy .21
In summary, the CMO reform has reduced the magnitude of public
interventionism considerably. Within regions such as La Rioja and Aquitaine,
the abandonment of grubbing out and distillation subsidies has been
legitimated by endogenous actors and, consequently, has become institutiona-
lized. This is less so in regions such as Castilla–La Mancha, where debate
continues over the social and political meaning accorded to this policy change.
In contrast, the removal of plantation rights has sparked such a level of
resistance within all wine regions and across its professions that its
institutionalization now looks distinctly improbable.
A Reprogramming of Markets?
A second part of the 2008 reform concerns attempts by public and collective
actors to assist European wine producers and merchants by restructuring the
range of wines they produce and ‘simplifying’ their presentation to the public.
Driven by a perceived need to confront their ‘challengers’ (Fligstein, 2001)
from the New World more directly, this objective has given rise to change in
two policy instruments: the definition of wine (through a list of authorized
practices) and the official categories that are used both to segment markets and
organize production. In the case of the former, a drive to remove restrictions
on producers and merchants was legitimized by evoking a ‘level playing field’
for Europeans competing in ‘globalized markets’ (section ‘Liberalizing
oenological practices’). Meanwhile, the change in categorization sought to
recalibrate the supply of EU wine using policy tools that are regulatory and
virtually budget-free (section ‘Recategorizing European wine around
“geographical indications” ’). In the mid-2000s, initial reaction from producers
to the Commission’s proposals on these issues was often hostile to the former
while broadly welcoming the latter. However, translating them both into
practice has thus far been a much smoother process for the new oenological
rules than it has for the adoption of revised wine categories.
Liberalizing oenological practices
Through the 2008 reform the Commission succeeded in obtaining the power
to authorize oenological practices. According to its representatives, rapid
technical change in the wine sector necessitated rapid and flexible policy
responses that the Council of Ministers was not equipped to provide. Their
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unstated objective was to align EU rules in this area with those used in ‘the
New World’, where many more oenological interventions are authorized in
the name of stabilizing wine quality and thereby meeting the requirements of
‘the modern consumer’. Although change in the EU’s definition of wine and
who controls it has sparked isolated politicized controversies,22 in each of the
vineyards we have studied it has been widely accepted and even warmly
welcomed. In short, the new EU legislation on this point has been fully
institutionalized within the practice of individual operators, interest groups
and public authorities. This thus appears to confirm that most European
producers and merchants now accept that they ‘need’ to align their practices in
this respect with those of New World producers. Nevertheless, this acceptance
of the legitimacy of the new oenological rules is not simply the result of its
supposed facilitation of production and lowering of costs. Rather, this
legitimacy is the result of a long-term struggle among experts in the European
wine field to normalize the liberalization of rules as part of a quest to meet the
needs of ‘the modern consumer’ – a category of thought and action whose
construction we have analysed elsewhere (Roger, 2010).
This liberalization is almost completely accepted in Romania and Spain. In
the former, the loss of national control in this matter has not provoked any
controversy, and this largely because its leading experts were already heavily
involved in the OIV and therefore consider the latter as perfectly legitimate.
In Spain, the FEV sees this change positively because it is ‘simpler’ and more
‘flexible’, thus opening up opportunities for using new oenological practices
that until now had been outlawed in the EU. It considers also that deciding on
such issues within the OIV is a sufficient guarantee that ‘the fundamental
characteristics of wine’ will nevertheless be preserved (FEV, 2009, p. 38).
Elsewhere there has been slight concern that the Commission now has more
influence, and even power, in this area. This position, shared by the CCAE and
the Spanish state, pushed the latter to argue during the 2007–2008 negotiation
that the Council should retain authority on oenological practices.23 The FEV,
however, had no such fears, considering instead that it was a good thing that
the EU’s position here ‘no longer depended upon a laborious modification of
rules made within the Council’ (FEV, 2009, p. 38).
Even in France, the change in rules over oenological practices has been
largely accepted. This is most obvious in the discourse of wine merchants and
their representatives:
This was something we had wanted for a long time. The typical example
is the use of oak chips – until a couple of years ago we could not use them
in the EU whilst our competitiors could and that made their production
for the tastes wanted by the market easier. We had really tied our hands
behind our backs.24
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Nevertheless, some actors are still concerned by the perceived risk of
standardization they feel could result from these rules:
These changes have been necessary. They’ve taken place and that’s a
good thing. But this does not mean that we should just copy what the big
Australian or Californian brands are doing.25
Lines of tension still therefore divide actors within the wine industry about this
liberalization of oenological practices. However, for the moment at least, it is
no longer the deeply politicized issue it once was. Indeed, this measure appears
to fit relatively harmoniously with the practices of European producers and
merchants. It thus appears that this part of the CMO reform is well on its way
to becoming institutionalized.
Recategorizing European wine around ‘geographical indications’
In contrast to this relative serenity over oenological practices, the change to the
categories of European wine introduced by the EU reform has generated a
great deal more private, collective and public uncertainty and debate. Whereas
before this reform three broad types of wine were marketed (‘table wine’,
AOCs and ‘vins de pays’), now wines are classified as being either with or
without ‘geographical indications’ (GIs).26 These policy instruments limit the
provenance of grapes and set many production and processing rules in the
form of territory-linked specifications. This change made in 2008 was
ostensibly to ‘simplify supply’ by on the one hand recasting table wines (thus
hopefully making them easier to market), while on the other encouraging
producers of AOCs and vins de pays to become more demanding about their
respective quality.27 However, other than in Romania where this part of the
CMO reform has been adopted wholesale and without debate,28 for the
moment at least a great deal of doubt remains about both the commercial
utility and the political coherence of this policy change.
Reinventing ‘table wines’
Over the course of the last couple of decades, the term ‘table wine’ has become
a stigma in most of Europe and elsewhere. Potentially produced from grapes
that could come from anywhere in the EU and without constraining rules
about yield levels in particular, by the mid-2000s many experts, merchants and
even producers considered that table wines had become virtually unmarke-
table. The solution concocted by Commission officials was to invent a new
administrative category (‘wines without GIs’), and then to encourage their
marketing by grape varietal and year.
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On this subject, national actors from Spain had already attempted
significant change before the CMO reform when in 2006 they introduced the
category ‘Vin˜edos de Espan˜a’. Created by the Ministry of Agriculture at the
request of the FEV, this move provoked intense resistance from certain
Autonomous Communities and in particular the Rioja and Castilla y Leo´n.
Indeed the latter, or more precisely its GI ‘Ribera del Duero’, took the
national government to court over this category. After lengthy legal
transactions, the Spanish national court of justice Audiencia nacional struck
down the decree that had created it. After modification, it was reintroduced
but has continued to cause controversy, this time at the European scale,29
because the Commission refused the use of the name of a member state as a
GI, except if there is a proven link between the quality and the reputation of
the wine produced and the concerned GI.30 Just as importantly, in the
interim an alliance of actors from Spanish regions, including Castilla y
Mancha (who many thought might have seen in this category a solution for
its table wines), put pressure on their national government to abandon the
category ‘Vin˜edos de Espan˜a’ once and for all, a goal they finally achieved in
February 2011. As an interviewee from the government of the Rioja put it in
an interview, this category was stigmatized as ‘a fraud’:
Ultimately Vin˜edos de Espan˜a would use a GI for getting rid of no
matter what table wine that comes from just anywhere in the country,
and this without any form of control.31
Similarly, according to interviewees from the COAG, opposition to this
category was principally fuelled by fears about the effect it would have not only
on the wine sold with this label on the bottle, but more generally on the image
of all Spanish wines:
Who controls the quality of a wine that wears the label ‘vin de France’ ?
If I buy a bottle of Vins de France and its undrinkable I won’t buy French
wine anymore. (y) It’s a category that the wine merchants (la industria)
looked favorably upon because the British consumer, who does not
know Bordeaux or another such wine area, looks for the country, sees
Vins de France and says to themselves, ‘Ok, I’ll buy that’. But then ‘ah,
disgusting, never again’. It’s a risk.32
More generally, as representatives of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture
underlined to us, the new rules for wines without GIs meant that the name
‘Vin˜edos de Espan˜a’ no longer had any justification: the EU now authorizes
the practices that its supporters wanted, and this without raising issues for the
rest of Spanish wine.
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In France one would need to study the situation in Languedoc Roussillon in
order to fully grasp the impact of this part of the CMO reform. Indeed, wedded
to AOCs or vins de pays, most actors in Aquitaine consider that it does not
directly concern them. Nevertheless large wine merchants present in several
French vineyards certainly do. Here the development over time of one such
merchant’s approach to the collective brand ‘Vins de France’ is revealing:
Two years ago we would have said ‘this is nonsense’, because it would
disrupt everything and create confusion because it is just administrative.
So it was communautaire, reglementary but it would not help much at all.
However, once we had reflected on this, we said it might be useful on
export markets, to help us fight New World wines with the same
weapons. So we said ‘let’s try to build something here’.
The current shortfall in supply of such wines is partly due to Bordelais
producers having refused until 2011 to ‘declassify’ their AOC wines and sell
them without Bordeaux’s famous GI. As the following citation from another
wine merchant reveals, the issue seems to be one of identity. For such actors,
wines without GIs:
belong to another conception of production. What would going in that
direction imply ? It would mean producing in vineyards that are of a
lesser quality. If there are vineyards that are of a lower quality, they must
be taken out of the AOC area. Then, what is the interest of doing this ?
(y). No, no, there is a beautiful AOC called Bordeaux, and we just need
to continue working on our image and the quality of our wines.33
Nonetheless, in 2011, 130 000 hl of wine from Aquitaines’s cooperatives were
sold without an IG (up from 30 000 in 2010). More generally, representatives
of producers in this area now see this category as a means of regulating the
market for AOC wines.34 Rigorous information has yet to be generated about
the commercial and practical effects of the introduction of ‘wine without GIs’.
Nevertheless, as a rule it now appears to have legitimacy among producers and
merchants.
The relaunching of ‘wines with geographical indications’
As the case of Bordeaux underlines, despite the political and commercial
efforts made to distinguish and separate them, wines without or with GIs are
still part of the same global market and are thus in an interdependent
relationship. Much as actors strive to present and defend wines with GIs as
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meriting, sometimes by right, both consumer recognition and higher prices, this
clearly cannot simply be decreed. Instead, within each AOC region, AOC or vin
de pays zone, the classical strategy to achieve this goal considers that discipline
needs to be instilled for production and processing, and this before engaging in
collective marketing and promotion. In short, not only do time, energy and
money need to be invested, but sanctions must be placed on those who,
through failing to discipline themselves, are seen as discrediting and damaging
the collective brand.
In Spain the dominant representation of this issue area is that they had already
put their house in order first through their system of : (y) DOPs (Denominacio´n
de origen protegida), (y) (introduced in the 1930s and extensively used in the
Rioja in the 1980s and 1990s) and second through the category vinos de la tierra
(as of 2003). Indeed, over the last 8 years the latter has been used in Castilla–La
Mancha in particular so as to differentiate and add value to its wines.
By contrast, in Romania this part of the CMO reform is frequently seen in a
positive light. This is because it appears to have given more room for the
equivalents of Vins de pays to develop, particularly for the country’s internal
market:
AOCs involve extra controls, so higher costs that impact on prices. In our
country price is the key factor for consumers, particularly since the latest
crisis (y). Most companies now use the Vin de pays category rather than
the AOC. It’s less constraining and the difference is not recognized. A GI
and a brand provides sufficient status. It’s efficient, and with that AOCs
lose their efficiency.35
In France national measures were introduced in 2007–2008 in order to tighten
the AOC certification system. But the EU scale measure nevertheless concerns
Bordeaux in particular because, as one wine merchant put it in an interview:
Over the last 20 years production has increased. Produce, produce,
produce. But with irregular qualities. Consequently products with the same
name can be found with prices that can vary from up to 10 times (y) The
consumer is lost. Then there are overlaps between AOCs as today some
Bordeaux are better than someMe´docs. It’s crazy. The French consumer is
lost, so you can imagine what it’s like for foreignersy .36
Nevertheless, nearly all producers still cling to the AOC category. Asked
whether there is internal debate over this issue, one director of a cooperative
replied that this was a question that was raised. However, he went on: ‘it’s a
question of pride, we would be renouncing being a member of the most noble
category of wines’.37
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In concluding on this point, the first word that comes to mind is
‘uncertainty’. Has this policy change simplified the structuring and presenta-
tion of European wines? More fundamentally, has it resegmented markets?
For the moment, and notably because of the blind faith that for so long has
been invested in AOCs as a category, one can be sceptical on both counts.
Indeed, as with the issue of oenological practices, a paradox seems to mark this
subject area: the CMO’s reform aimed at resegmenting European wine, but it
has only had effects when it has provoked localized forms of politicization and
conflict leading to institutionalized change.
Conclusions
It would obviously be hasty to draw firm conclusions about a policy reform
that is still being implemented. Nonetheless, three general lessons can be drawn
from our analysis.
The first concerns the diversity of representations, actions and practices that
have been inspired by the reform and, thus, the causes of differentiated
institutionalization. It is hardly surprising that in different vineyards the EU’s
attempt at policy change has produced different reactions. However, this
degree of difference is also to be found between the various parts of the reform
and within vineyards and even professions. In concluding that comparable
variations in social learning should be analysed around state-society relations,
Peter Hall rightly cautioned ‘against positing too rigid a distinction between
the state and society and against an insistence on the autonomy of the state’
(1993, p. 292). However, the dimension of scale also needs building into such
analysis, and not only because in this case an EU scale has been heavily
involved.
Indeed, this point also has theoretical relevance given that we have found
that the principal causes of differentiated institutionalization can be traced to
the varying types of legitimation and conflict that have been sparked around
different dimensions of the CMO’s reform. Compare the intensity of the
evocation of values over plantation rights in the Bordelais, for example, with
that of the distribution of subsidies for grubbing out vines in Spain. Moreover,
even when a particular policy instrument appears to have engendered political
work throughout the EU (for example, over oenological practices), the content
and objective of such activity has generally been quite different. This point is
important to our particular brand of constructivist institutionalism because it
provides analytical purchase on the level of reinstitutionalization that the
CMO’s reform has engendered. More precisely, considering as we do that full
institutionalization only takes place after conflicts and/or debates over values
that permit legitimation of change or reproduction (Lagroye, 1985), our case
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studies confirm the theoretical and empirical validity of studying legitimation
within institutionalism. Indeed, we consider that studying policy implementa-
tion in this way adds theoretical value to existing work by constructivists such
as Colin Hay (2006) who study ‘post-formative’ institutionalization.
Our final conclusion concerns the extent to which such a framework enables
one to ascertain whether the European wine industry is governed today at the
scale of the EU. In previous research on the period before the 2008 reform,
we argued that an EU government (that is, a set of institutions established at,
and applying across, the EU scale) affected only table wines and specific issues
such as oenological practices (Smith et al, 2007). Moreover, this form of EU
government had always been dominated by growers to such an extent that
merchants and Commission representatives were largely sidelined. What is
already clear from our research is that neither of these findings hold true any
more. Despite the resistance it has encountered, merchants have gained
legitimacy in and access to this new version of EU government to the detriment
of growers. More fundamentally still, the 2008 reform has meant that there is
now EU government of all categories of wine, and that a wider range of issue
areas are now partially regulated at this scale. This certainly does not imply
that national and regional scales have been replaced. But it does mean that the
EU-wide scale is interwoven much deeper into the government of the industry
as a whole. Indeed, given that this interweaving is precisely what we consider
research on the institutionalization of the EU should be examining and
comparing, this article is ultimately a proposition on how that analytical
challenge can best be tackled.
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Notes
1 For details on the reform, its genesis and its negotiation, see Roger (2010).
2 In addition to a similar campaign conducted in Brussels (15 interviews), to date a series of
in-depth interviews have been conducted with relevant public officials, interest groups and
firm representatives and ‘experts’ in France (20 interviews), Spain (11) and Romania (14).
These national vineyards have been selected using both the principle of ‘smallest difference’
(Sartori, 1991) and the criteria of historical consolidation, that is, the objective of
comparison is to grasp the differences in implementing the CMO reform in a case where it
challenges forms of regulation and legitimation that are firmly anchored in history (France),
another in which the sector is being restructured and has yet to stabilize (Romania) and an
intermediary case (Spain). In France, institutionalized rules and practices dating from the
beginning of the twentieth century gave considerable power to producer representatives and
were largely transposed to the EU scale as of the 1960s (Smith et al, 2007). In Romania the
decollectivization policies of 1991-2000 preceded this country’s accession to the EU in 2007.
However, European funding already had considerable impact on infra-national distributions
of power (Roger, 2012). In Spain, European accession in 1986 also had considerable effects,
but these have never been dominated by one category of actor. Meanwhile, the principle of
smallest difference has led us to compare more specifically economic spaces with equivalent
volumes of annual production: Aquitaine (5.5 million hectolitres), La Rioja (5.7 million) and
Romania as a whole (6 million) because in that country wine regions are not spaces for
regulation or interest representation. This research is part of a wider project on le
gouvernement europe´en des industries (GEDI) financed by the French Agence nationale de la
recherche. The other industries covered are cars, pharmaceuticals and aquaculture. We thank
our GEDI colleagues, Colin Hay and CEP’s referees for their comments on initial versions of
this text. Xabier Itc¸aina also acknowledges the support of the European Commission under
the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship.
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3 For reasons of space, we do not analyse here the take-up of the EU’s micro-economic measures
(promotion and investment aids), which ostensibly aim to improve ‘the competitiveness’ of
individual wine producers and merchants.
4 Confederacio´n de cooperativas agro-alimentarias, ‘Resultados del re´gimen de arranque´ de
vin˜edo de la actual OCM vitivinı´cola’. Fuente: FEGA, elaboracio´n propia.
5 Interview, president of the wine committee of the COAG (Confederacio´n de organizaciones de
agricultores y ganaderos), Madrid, February 2011.
6 Interview with representative of a wine merchant company in Bordeaux, February 2011.
7 Since the reform of the CMO, Romania receives 42.1 million euros each year to cofinance its
‘national envelope’. Its government is free to prioritize the measures it selects from DG AGRI’s
list (Article 5 of Regulation 479/2008). Thus far, it has not chosen to subsidize the grubbing out
of hybrid vines, arguing in particular that the farms concerned are too small and therefore
ineligible. Instead 83 per cent of the national envelope has gone to restructuration (replanting
old vines of ‘noble’ varietals) or reconversion (replacing one noble varietal with another). The
rest of the envelope has been spent on measures such as harvest insurance (5 per cent) and
investment aids (5 per cent), leaving only 1 per cent for promoting Romanian wines in third
countries.
8 Interview, representative of the Organizatia Nationale Interprofesionale Vitivinicola (ONIV),
August 2010.
9 Under its accession agreement, no new plantings were to be authorized in Romania until
August 2010. Since then, the principle of liberalization has simply been applied with little or no
resistance.
10 Interview with representative of a large French wine merchant, Bordeaux, September 2010.
11 This consensus may of course be misleading because it is not necessarily synonymous with
unanimity: actors are often hostile to the abolition of plantation rights for very different
reasons.
12 Interview with representative of the FEV, Madrid, February 2011.
13 Vitisphere.com, 24 May 2011.
14 Interview with president of the COAG’s wine committee, Madrid, February 2011.
15 Interview with representative of the CCAE, February 2011.
16 Lamberto V. Gancia, CEEV President, CEEV press release, 10 May 2011.
17 Interview with representative of the Iroule´guy wine cooperative, February 2011.
18 As recently as 1995, two-thirds of Spanish wine was white and one-third red, and this despite
consumption patterns being almost exactly the opposite. Since then the amount of red has
increased and that of white has decreased, but the continuing existence of distillation subsidies
has often been blamed for slowing the latter trend.
19 Interview COAG, Madrid, February 2011.
20 Interview CCAE, Madrid, February 2011.
21 Interview, Madrid, February 2011.
22 Notably over the definition of rose´ wine in 2008 in the south of France. For analysis of this
episode, see the annual report of the FEV (2009, pp. 37–39).
23 Interview, Spanish Ministry of Environment, Rural and Marine affairs, Madrid, February
2011.
24 Interview, wine merchant interest group, Bordeaux, April 2010.
25 Interview, director of a wine merchant company, Bordeaux, February 2011.
26 That is, the national equivalents of the latter two.
27 In the previous system, AOCs had to correspond to precise areas (‘terroirs’) and product
specifications. Vins de table (VDT) on the other hand were to be sold with labels that did not
mention the varietals used and the year or area of production. In the 1970s a third category was
added – Vins de Pays (VDP) – where varietals, years and ‘terroir’ could all be mentioned.
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However, and contrary to expectation, a pyramid-type logic did not result: many VDPs came to
be sold for higher prices than some AOCs. The 2008 reform thus sought to group AOCs and
VDPs together under the term ‘wine with geographical indications (GIs)’, while allowing the
labels of a new category of ‘wine without GIs’ to feature varietals, places of origin and years of
production. Moreover, wine from this category has no limits set on the intensity of its
production, can be mixed with other wines and can even be partially de-alcoholized.
28 In Romania, there are 402 referenced wines. Eleven are ‘wine without GIs’ (vinuri de masa˘ –
VM), 42 are ‘superior’ (vinuri superioare – VS), while there are 349 AOCs (Denumiri de origine
controlata˘ – DOC). However, the latter concern only 15 493 ha (8 per cent of the national wine
area). Moreover, these are rarely exported and the category is not a major selling point for the
internal market. Here the importance of historical sedimentation is an important explanation of
variation (see note 2).
29 ‘Bruselas ignora los planes del Gobierno espan˜ol de resucitar “Vin˜edos de Espan˜a” ’, Lo mejor
del vino de Rioja, 24 July 2009.
30 ‘Bruselas insta a modificar ‘Vin˜edos de Espan˜a’. La resolucio´n llega tras un recurso presentado
por el Gobierno de la Rioja’, Navactiva.com, 12 May 2010.
31 Logron˜o, July 2011.
32 Interview, Madrid, February 2011.
33 Interview, director of wine merchant company, Bordeaux, February 2011.
34 Press release published in Wine Alley, 12 December 2011.
35 Interview, representative of the PNVV, March 2011.
36 Interview, manager of wine merchant company, Bordeaux, September 2010.
37 Interview, director of Iroule´guy’s co-operative, February 2011.
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